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During the 52 years between the Unification of the Kingdom of Italy and World War 1, the lira was legally
convertible into metal for a limited period of time. Although not formally committed to gold, the lira exchange
towards the gold standard countries proved remarkably stable, “shadowing” gold.
It is widely claimed that being one of the successful members of the gold standard circle entailed a number of
advantages. If the lira was closely linked to gold, suggesting that there was only a small cost connected to adopting the
gold standard, then why did Italy not make all possible efforts to resume as soon as possible and adhere more strictly
to the gold standard?
Italy had a large foreign debt that was basically the result of Unification. This debt was denominated in lira, but
foreign holders could convert their coupons into gold at the official  rate in Paris. Italy could exploit its domestic
bondholders by allowing the lira to depreciate, while insisting that domestic holders of the debt accept lira. But there
were limits to this process  because  Italians could take the coupons to Paris have  them paid in gold and because
payments abroad, in gold, became more expensive following depreciation.
The paper  explores  the various measures  the Italian government used to prevent arbitrage, and the strategies
bondholders used to circumvent them. In the end, however, it was clear that if devaluation went too far, most of the
coupons would be presented in Paris, the debt would de facto became a gold debt, and the Italian Treasury would suffer
a substantial loss of gold. Hence the convenience of letting the lira float downward and exploit seignorage any time
domestic conditions became more critical.  At the same time it was necessary to keep depreciation within a certain
range, “shadowing” the lira par value.2
Paper Money but a Gold Debt. Italy on the Gold Standard
1
The core countries of the gold standard - Britain, France and Germany – strictly adhered to
convertibility. However, during the second half of the 19th century, in the European periphery, the
gold standard rule was repeatedly broken and, once abandoned, a considerable time passed before
the old parity was resumed. Many countries  experienced  persistent  fiscal  problems  and  issued
paper money to gain seigniorage. This behaviour usually occurred in periods of military conflict. In
the  face of declining economic activity,  Latin  American  countries  suspended convertibility in
wartime, and returned to gold at heavily depreciated parities. The European periphery suspended on
several occasions.
In Austria-Hungary the national bank was forced to suspend convertibility in 1848 following
the revolution in Hungary and the subsequent military conflict. Greece abandoned convertibility in
1868 as a result of the revolution in Crete and twice again in other wars. A similar course was
followed by Russia and Spain. Japan adhered to the gold standard only in 1894. Gold convertibility
was abandoned in the US at the outbreak of the American Civil war (Bordo and Kydland, 1995, 438;
Eichengreen and Flandreau, 1996, p. 117).
The Kingdom of Italy was unified in 1861 and the lira adopted the bimetallic French system.
Convertibility was suspended after a few years, following the war with Austria in 1866. While
proclaiming its firm commitment to resume the old parity, seventeen years went by before the
government declared resumption in 1883; yet a few months later the banks of issue halted  free
conversion. Convertibility was never resumed.
During the 52 years between Unification of the kingdom and World War I, Italy was legally on
a bi-metallic exchange regime for 15 years (from 1861 to 1866 and from 1883 to 1893), but the
                                                
1  I wish to thank M. Bordo, G. Felloni, M. Flandreau, G. Ludbrook, I. Procidano, E. White and the
participants of the workshops in “Money, Economic History and Finance” (Centre for Monetary and Financial History,
Rutgers University), “Convergences en histoire économique” (OFCE, Paris) and “Seminari di economia” (University of
Trento) for helpful comments.3
period of official lira convertibility was much shorter, at most seven years. Although not formally
committed to gold, the lira exchange  rate was remarkably stable, ‘shadowing gold’ (Figure 1).
2  
Close adherence to the gold standard provided countries with certain benefits. They  signaled
their commitment to orthodox policies that  refrained from creating fiscal and monetary surprises
prejudicial to lenders’ interests, and probity was rewarded through the low cost of capital in the
international financial market. If the advantages of adherence to the gold standard were as large as
Bordo and Rockoff (1996) and Bordo and Kydland (1997) have argued, and if Italian exchange
depreciation tended to be small, suggesting that it might have cost little to adopt the gold standard,
why did Italy not make a greater effort to resume as soon as possible and adhere more strictly to the
gold  standard ? Did lira  depreciation  allow  the Italian government to gain  seigniorage ? Was
seigniorage on  government debt an important source of revenue ?
This paper discusses the constraints that the government debt market imposed upon  Italy’s
collection of seigniorage. Contrary to what Bordo and Rockoff  have assumed
3, one of the main
constraints on Italian policy was the fact that there was no paper or gold debt for Italy, but rather a
gold debt priced in gold abroad and in paper currency in Italy.
The paper is structured as follows. First, Italian fiscal policy and tax smoothing is discussed.
Taxation was politically costly to enforce and was not a flexible instrument, particularly with the
fiscal structure of the new kingdom. Given the large budget deficit, in 1866 and in 1888-89, the
Italian government rationally preferred debt and advantageously smoothed the tax  burden over
several years; only for a limited period of time (1866-1873) did the government  turn to deficit
                                                
2 From 1861 to 1913 the floating of the lira took place within very strict margins with a standard deviation of
4.2: the standard deviation decreases to 2.9 if the war years are skipped, and it is with this time span that we are mainly
concerned. The maximum divergence from the average yearly exchange with gold standard currencies on a few occasions
only reached values of 12% and Italy never resorted to competitive devaluations. On the whole, the lira exchange
proved remarkably stable against gold standard currencies and it is said to have "shadowed" gold rather closely; the lira
exchange against a typical gold currency, the British pound, is a stationary variable (Tattara and Volpe, 1997, pp. 246-
47). The lira exchange was, on the whole, much more stable than the ruble, the Austrian florin, the peseta, the US
dollar itself, which depreciated heavily in 1864-65 (Flandreau, 1998).
3 Italian Rendita yields in lire are  derived  from the prices of the Rendita paper  bond and are  meaningfully
compared with Rendita yields in gold as if they referred to two different bonds in Bordo and Rockoff (1996, table 3).
The comparison has not the meaning attributed to it by Bordo and Rokoff, as the price of the Rendita paper bond is in
fact the price of the Rendita gold bond, expressed in lire.4
monetization. Second, the high level of the Italian public debt is discussed. Debt placement on the
international market is examined and a common misunderstanding about the Rendita prices in Italy
and abroad is corrected: Italian public debt was a gold debt, domestically priced in lire. Third, the
close integration between the Italian and foreign (French) capital market is explained: capital could
move with very low transaction costs between the domestic and the foreign markets. Nearly perfect
capital mobility during the period implied that the rate of interest on the Italian government debt
was established on the international market, and the gold clause on most of the debt “anchored” the
exchange rate of the lira to gold, making large depreciations unprofitable to the government both in
the long and in the short run. The Italian government’s attempt to segment the market and to force
Italian investors to be paid in lire when the lira exchange  weakened was successful, although its
success was limited by the lira depreciation being kept within narrow margins.
The conclusion is that there were serious constraints on a debt devaluation policy since what
looked like a paper debt was really a gold debt, and the gold debt acted as a stabilizing device for
foreign and domestic investors. The key to borrowing cheaply abroad was neither the lira’s legal
adherence to gold  nor its convertibility (Bordo and Rockoff, 1996; Eichengreen  and Flandreau,
1996, 114), but debt convertibility. Exchange  flexibility was nonetheless important in promoting
economic development of the young kingdom, as it enlarged the choice of the policy instruments
available to the government and helped the adjustment process.
<Figure  1 approximately here>
1.  Italian Fiscal Virtue
Immediately after Unification, Italy  had a huge public debt  inherited from the constituent
states. Previous debts were merged and transformed into the new kingdom’s public debt,  which
from the onset amounted to 50% of Italian GNP (Ministero del Tesoro, 1988).
4  A high nominal and
real rate of interest on debt and a low GNP growth rate drove the ratio of the Italian debt to GNP
upwards. The unbalanced budget due to the protracted emergency added to the precarious initial
                                                
4 Almost all the previous debts of the states were recognized: 50% of the total was Piedmontese and derived
from the wars of independence fought by Piedmont and the Kingdom of Sardinia (Sachs, 1883, pp. 459-463).5
situation. In addition to the military costs from unification, the fight against brigantaggio in the
south and the need to build basic railways and other infrastructures increased the debt. Public debt
to GNP doubled in eight years, reaching 100% by the end of the 1860s. Interest on debt constituted
from 30 to 40% of total government expenditures (Ministero del Tesoro,1969, IV, table 5).
Politically, tax increases were ruled out and when, the war against  Austria imminent, the
Italian Prime Minister asked the Rothschilds to endorse a new debt, they refused. The Rothschilds
acted as Rendita dealers, not simply brokers, and kept a large stock of Italian debt in their portfolios
(De Cecco, 1992, doc. 49). They  feared that a request for additional funds on the international
capital market would reduce Rendita prices, and was thus to be rejected at all costs (De Cecco,
1992, doc. 51). If  revenue had to be raised to face war costs and taxation and new debt issues were
ruled out, the alternatives were printing money and selling public assets. The Rothschilds enhanced
such a policy, which was convenient to them and possibly to the Italian government, as it preserved
a valuable reputation for the Rendita in the “elastic demand” international capital market.
The government tried hard to find new sources of revenue. Land and railways were privatized
(Zamagni, 1990, p. 225) and a compulsory low interest debt (5%) was issued in 1866.
5 Rendita
purchases by the Banca Nazionale – a commercial bank and the largest bank of issue – reached a
peak in 1866 under government pressure (De Mattia, 1967, 1, table 2), but the Rendita price
declined. At the same time, the Banca Nazionale was pressed to make huge discounts and advances
in favour of small banks heavily involved in the crisis of the domestic silk market in Genoa and
Turin. In 1866, 83% of all Banca Nazionale discount and advances operations  were channelled to
four small banks to which the Banca Nazionale was tied, leaving other customers empty-handed.
6 In
the  same  year, the government  pressed the Banca  Nazionale for a loan.  The credit market
experienced unprecedented stringency, and convertibility was suspended, releasing banks of issue
from their metal reserve requirements.
7  Inconvertibility paved the way for new requests for loans
                                                
5 One percent interest was added, as a lottery premium, and the debt maturity was 13 years. In 1866-1868
interest in foreign markets on Italian public debt averaged 10% (Rendita interest in Paris).
6 Credito Mobiliare di Torino e Firenze, Banco di Sconto e Sete di Torino, Cassa Generale di Genova and Cassa
di Sconto di Genova (Di Nardi, 1953, pp. 122-25).
7 It is questionable, and was indeed questioned by the Parliamentary Commission on Forced Currency, whether
the abandonment of convertibility in 1866 was an inevitable consequence of war expenditures or whether it was the
first-lender-of-last-resort operation undertaken by the government in favor of the banking system. The Commission6
from the government.
8 Although current deficits were reduced by the 1870s, the Treasury did not
renew all the debt coming to maturity and thus monetized part of the stock because of the high cost
of new Rendita placements both on the domestic and on foreign markets.
9 (Ministero  del Tesoro,
1969, vol. 4, 5). The bank had become a fiscal device for the government, to which it offered a
flexible source of low-cost credit, and from which it was remunerated by creating rents  from its
unique charter.
10
Half the current budget deficits for the eight years 1866-1873 was monetized, and  money
provided to the Treasury amounted to three-quarters of the circulation increase in the same period
(De Mattia, 1967,1.1,table 2). During suspension, circulation could not exceed the ratio of one-third
between paper money and silver and gold reserves, and in 1868 a maximum amount of issues was
established.
11
The fiscal effort made by the Italian government after Unification was strenuous. During the
first fifteen years of the kingdom, public revenues rose rapidly and their source changed. In 1872 the
current budget was almost brought under control because of a rise in taxes and the deficit remained
                                                                                                                                                        
argued for the latter while it viewed the Treasury’s financial situation in 1866 with relative calm (Di Nardi, 1953, pp.
121-138).
8 Almost exactly the same path had been followed in financing the 1848 War of Independence:  international
market closure, monetization of part of the Treasury deficit and depreciation (Conte, 1990). The situation returned to
normal within a couple of years.
9 The amount of debt coming to maturity that was not renewed  from 1867 to 1873 was 811 million lire.
(Ministero del Tesoro, 1969, vol. 4, table 5). Total advances from the Banca Nazionale from 1.4.1866 to 30.6.1874
were 790 million lire. (Di Nardi, 1953, p. 139).
10 Loans to the Treasury had a service cost that was, on average, less than one-third the price of interest-bearing
debt. Banks of issue balance  sheets prove, on the other hand, that their net income, until the late 1870s, was
increasingly due to operations with the Treasury: interests on advances, commissions etc. (De Mattia, 1977, tables
101,102). The close link between Banca Nazionale and the Treasury raised a lengthy debate that resulted in the 1874
monetary reform. Biglietti consortili substituted money previously issued on the Treasury’s account and all the banks
of issue were now put on an equal footing.
11 A few numbers  are  sufficient to document the Banca Nazionale’s increasing importance.  Banca  Nazionale
reaped the main advantage from the law, as its loans to the Treasury were counted as reserves; other banks of issue
could include their credits towards Banca Nazionale in their reserves.
The ratio circulation/metal reserves for Banca Nazionale went from 0.50 in 1865 to a low of 0.11 in 1873; it
stayed around 0.50 for the other banks of issue. Banca Nazionale issued 43% of total circulation in 1865, 79% in 1873.
(De Mattia, 1967, vol.1, table 2).7
within very narrow limits until 1874; 1875 saw the first - albeit slight -  surplus. Total revenues
were 7% of GNP, and rose to 12% in 1873, and 13% in 1880 (Brosio and Marchese, 1986, table
8A). In 1862-65, 40% of public revenues came from land taxes, the rest  mainly from indirect taxes
and customs duties. In just a few years, land proceeds fell to 9% of total revenues and income taxes
were raised from nil to 15% (Ministero del Tesoro, 1969, vol. 3, table 12 and 13).
The deficit rose again in 1885-1891. Expenditures for railways and for the army reached high
levels  in  1888-91,  while revenue declined. Debt  grew  almost continuously until 1897 when it
reached 120% of Italian GNP (Ministero del Tesoro, 1988). In Europe, Italy’s per capita debt stock
was in third place after France and Portugal (Fenn’s Compendium,1889).
In the late 1880s-early 1890s the current budget deficit declined as expenditures  fell, and
revenues increased when the economy entered a phase of rapid economic growth. Money  creation
for the Treasury was now insignificant. The international capital market requested a low real interest
on the Italian debt, but it was particularly the high growth rate of GNP and the primary budget
surplus that accompanied the country from 1897 to the First World War that made the debt/GNP
curve bend definitively downward.
12
                                                
12  The debt/GNP ratio is expressed by Bt/Yt - Bt-1/Yt-1 = (r – g)Bt-1/Yt-1 + (Gt -Tt)/Yt   where B is debt, Y is
GNP (Istat, 1957, table 36), r the rate of interest on debt (Spinelli and Fratianni, 2001.pp. 51-52), g is GNP rate of
growth, G –T is the budget primary balance computed taking the current balance (Ercolani, 1969, pp. 432-433) and
deducting from it the interest on the public debt (Ministero del Tesoro, 1988). Bt/Yt is from Zamagni (1998).
                           Bt/Yt - Bt-1/Yt-1          (r – g)Bt-1/Yt-1 (Gt -Tt)/Yt
1862-1866:   3.9 1.4 2.5
1866-1873:  3.1 4.3  -1.2
1881-1893:  0.4 2.7 -2.4
1894-1901:   -1.2 2.6 -3.8
1901-1913: -1.9 1.4 -3.38
2. Debt Overhang Management: Italian Rendita Issues
Public debt over GNP stayed at high levels over the whole period, and its management was
the main task facing the Italian government of the time. In the early 1860s, two-thirds of the Italian
public debt was represented by a perpetuity:  Rendita  Italiana.  The  remaining  one-third was
represented by short-term bonds (Ministero del Tesoro, 1998). Rendita market interest went as high
as 12% in June 1866. Interest    expenditures  accounted for 40% of yearly current budget
expenditures and made the Italian budget structure very inflexible (Ministero del Tesoro,1988, IV,
5).
Various classes of Rendita were marketed, according to the nominal interest paid and to the
owner’s status. Rendita 5% prevailed. Rendita was either made out to the bearer or registered. In
1877 a mixed Rendita was devised: the bond was registered but the coupon was payable to the
bearer. Coupons related to the bearer and to mixed Rendita could be cashed abroad, either by Italians
or  foreigners, and were paid in foreign  currency.  Bearer  Rendita  was (almost) the only bond
negotiated abroad.
13 Registered Rendita was negotiated domestically, subscribed by renter investors:
insurance companies and other private institutions, non-profit organisations, minors, etc. (Felloni,
1964, p. 153). Coupons cashed domestically were paid in lire (Piccinelli,1897, p.17).
Rendita was traded on foreign markets such as Paris, Berlin, Vienna and London. More than
half of the Rendita were issued in Paris, with the intervention of the Rothschilds.
14 It is henceforth
referred to as the Paris Rendita. Rendita abroad  was  exactly  the  same certificate as Rendita
negotiated in Italy. The value of the Rendita coupon paid abroad was always larger than 10% of the
interest burden on total Rendita stock, but varied between 25 and 85% of Rendita to the bearer,
which was the “marketable” part of the whole stock.
Rendita in the international market competed with various other assets, capital was free to
cross the national borders, and Italian investors could shift towards foreign competing assets: French
                                                
13  See Compagnie des agents de change (1882, p. 127). Actually, there is evidence of very limited payments
abroad for registered Rendita, less than 1.5% of the total value outstanding (Ministero del Tesoro, 1896, p.120).
14 See Sachs (1883, ch. VII). On the role of Paris in funding European government debts, see Fishlow (1985).
Till the late 1880s Paris was the only center where Rendita coupons were paid abroad. In the 1890s Berlin got
half of the Rendita coupons paid abroad went through Berlin (Ministero del Tesoro, 1896, p. 127).9
Rente, British consols and other foreign assets.
15 Coupon payment abroad was  made in foreign
currency.
16 Whoever collected the interest was of no importance: a foreign owner or an Italian owner
presented his coupon abroad and transferred the amount into lire at the current rate of exchange. Of
course, a perspicacious Italian investor would collect his coupon abroad whenever the  exchange
weakened. Not all Rendita owners arbitraged the coupon payment: naive investors were numerous
and would cash their coupon domestically, despite the devalued currency. These were presumably
low denomination bond holders and registered Rendita holders.
The uniqueness of the bond certificate  and  the almost perfect capital mobility made the
Rendita price in French francs in Paris (henceforth, the Paris price) equal, except for the lira-franc
spot exchange and transport negotiation and information costs, to the Rendita price in lire in Italy
(henceforth, the Milan price).
17 As no impediments pended to coupon transferability, the coupon
cashed in Paris in French francs (directly or because it was sent there from Italy) was equal to the
coupon cashed domestically in lire, expressed in francs.
Imagine a Rendita certificate with a face value of 100 lire, priced in French francs in Paris at
74.77, and a lira exchange depreciation of 7% from parity; the Milan price in lire is easily computed
from the Paris price multiplied by the exchange  depreciation 80.00 (i.e.74.77 x 1.07). This
equilibrium  condition is reflected in Rendita yields.  Freedom of capital movements and the
uniqueness of the Rendita certificate ensured that a Milanese could go to Paris, buy a Rendita there
and cash the coupon in francs for the rest of his life (5 French francs, annual, for a certificate of 100
face value, i.e. a yield of 6.69 at the current price of 74.77). He could get the same coupon in francs
from a Rendita certificate bought in Milan and subsequently  taken to Paris. Less shrewd Italian
investors would cash the coupon in the domestic market and receive 6.25 lire. 
18
                                                
15 Much of the Rendita abroad was in Italian hands, according to Minister Scialoja in his financial statement to
the King, 28 July 1866 (De Cecco, 1990, p. 25 n. 30)
16 It was subject to the same fiscal treatment as domestic interest (Felloni, 1964, p. 167)
17 Genoa was initially the most important stock exchange in Italy. We refer to Milan simply because it was the
stock exchange that grew in importance and eventually assumed a leading role.
18 Fratianni and Spinelli compare the Rendita prices in Florence and in Paris, implicitly assuming that the two
are expressed in the same currency. (Fratianni and Spinelli, 2001, p. 154 n. 40) and, in the same direction, Avesani and
Spinelli (1995, p.128 n.9).10
Sophisticated investors operated on the Milan market (via Paris) and on the Paris market as if
it were a single market in all respects: a very competitive market where Rendita coupons were
traded in convertible currencies “offshore” or in gold.
19
Rendita market Rendita price Nominal rate of interest Rendita yield
Competitive:Milan, via Paris 80.00 lire 5 francs 6.69%
Paris 74.77 francs 5 francs 6.69%
Secluded: Milan 80.00 lire 5 lire 6.25%
et is the spot rate of exchange defined as lira per unit of foreign exchange. PMt and PPt being the
price of the bond respectively in Milan (lire) and Paris (francs), the arbitrage condition is:
PMt = PPt
* et  (1)
Working with  Rendita yields produces the same  result.  Rendita yield in the competitive
market is computed as a ratio of the coupon face value c
* (in francs) and the price of the bond,
where the bond has infinite duration. iMt  is the Milan Rendita yield (lire) and iPt






iMt  = c
*et/PMt (3)




°  = c/PMt (4)
iMt
°  ≤  iMt whenever the lira exchange depreciated, i.e. c




* = 1 (5)
The exchange  at parity, prices and interest rates in the two markets are equal.
                                                
19 As has already been said, Rendita was a single consol and the only currency relevant both to the debtor and
the creditor was that in which the coupon was paid. Such a choice varied with demand, according to profitability,
except when explicitly limited by law.11
Rendita yield is exogenously established in the international market, iPt
*, and for a specified
nominal  interest,  Rendita price abroad is computed (2). Given the spot  rate of exchange, the
domestic yield and the domestic price are immediately settled.
The Milan Rendita price differed  from the Paris price expressed in lire because of transfer and
information costs.  Rendita  transfer  abroad  was performed through foreign  intermediaries. The
commission paid to negotiate Rendita on the Paris stock exchange  was 0.10-0.125% (Crampon,
1863, p. 21; Haupt, 1894, p. 569) to which a stamp  had to be added on a yearly basis, varying
between 0.12, bearer Rendita, and 0.15-0.30, registered Rendita (Deloison 1890, pp. 732, 781,786-
787). Commission varied according to the number of transactions in a year and the value of the bulk
transferred. To this are to be added the telegraph cost
20 and  the cost of collecting  the  relevant
information.
21 Transfer and related costs declined exponentially with the value of the traded bundle.
The estimated overall transfer costs were not inferior to 0.40% - 0.50%.
The lira value of the Paris Rendita (PPt
*et)  is multiplied by (1 ±  a),  where  a  represents
transfer and information costs paid by an investor willing to buy (sell) Rendita abroad. Transfer and
information costs  build a band around the  arbitrage  parity,  whose  upper (UBt) and lower (LPt)
boundaries are:
< Figure 2 approximately here >
 +PPt
*eta  = +c
*eta/iPt
* =  UBt  (6)
-  PPt
*eta  = - ct
*eta/iPt
* =  LBt (7)
Figure 2 plots the Rendita weekly price series in Milan (the “onshore” market) and in Paris
(functioning as an “offshore” market), computed as explained in the Appendix; deviations between
Milan and Paris prices closely parallel the lira/franc weekly exchange series, expressed as deviations
from parity.  Milan prices were invariably higher  than Paris prices, whenever the lira  exchange
                                                
20 For basic telegraph prices see Istat (1958, table 105) and the following footnote 24.
21 Rendita abroad might entail a limited risk due to fear of discrimination. But the foreign market was so
important to the placement of the Italian debt that discriminating action against foreigners by the Italian government
was very unlikely.12
depreciated  with respect to gold. At times the Milan price reached  the Paris price without
overtaking it: the reason being that lira exchange was left free to float downward but was pegged
upward so that the Paris price could exceed the Milan price only for a very limited number of weeks
and by a tiny amount.
< Figure 3 approximately here >
Residuals from the arbitrage relation in equation (1) move  around  zero (Figure 3). The
arbitrage residuals are heteroschedastic: a higher deviation marks the first decade, when the market
and our knowledge of it was less perfect. The standard deviation is 0.9 for the whole period, which
declined to 0.3 from 1875. A band size of 1%, i.e. ± 0.50%, includes 90% of the observations in the
period 1875-1911 and 84% of all  the observations from 1865.
22  No substantial deviations and
breaks  emerge in the Rendita arbitrage  relation. After 1875, spikes are limited to a couple of
observations and materialize during few periods of policy changes and market turbulence.
Arbitrage residuals are affected by the poor appropriateness of our data base. First, our data
are daily averages of extreme prices (daily maximum and minimum), and although spot transactions
by small investors were often performed at the “average”,
23 proper  ask and bid prices would be
needed. Moreover, the gap between the extremes varies in time. Second, the poor matching of the
first decade is possibly the result of exogenous shocks. Two wars were fought: the war between
Italy and Austria-Hungary in 1866 and the war between Prussia and France in 1871. Just after that,
from June 1874 for a couple of years, because of a brokers strike, Rendita prices in Italy were
“imputed” prices (Da Pozzo, 1964, p. 36);  many stock brokers performed illegal  transactions
outside the market, making price fixing unrepresentative. Third, Paris Rendita prices were received
                                                
22 To make things simpler the band size is computed on the Rendita nominal value. The same in Figure 3.
23  According to contemporaries “the average  price”  was often preferred in order to avoid  purchases being
performed at the highest price and sales at the lowest (Crampon, 1863, pp. 27-28).13
daily on the Italian Stock Exchange as of 1871.
24 Even then a certain amount of friction prevented
people from instantaneously transferring  funds even in very perfect markets, and an element of
inter-temporal  deviations was frequently embedded in data published daily. Transfers were
probably  slower for relatively small  amounts of funds and some operations  could  shift  from
Thursday to the following Monday  (for example, in the case of public holidays or other events
during which the stock market in one country was closed). In such a situation, the Rendita yield
included  a  very  limited inter-temporal component,  which adds to the above-mentioned
inappropriateness of the data set.
Looking at the weekly Rendita prices in Italy and in Paris, and at the weekly exchange figures
published by Pantaleoni (1895, enclosure E) concurrent with the depreciation of the lira, Fratianni
and Spinelli note “the appearance of a significant arbitrage differential between domestic and
international prices of Rendita Italiana” (1997, p. 94; 2001, p. 191). From the second semester of
1893, the lira started to depreciate, and from the month of July the ratio between the Milan and
Paris Rendita prices remained above the lira-franc exchange rate. According to the authors, this was
because of the high  lira depreciation, and  provided room for arbitrage activities.
25
                                                
24 Inadequate communications meant that national exchanges could operate without knowledge of their foreign
neighbors during the working day and make adjustments at the beginning of the next trading session, when information
regarding conditions elsewhere had been received. In the case of Rendita Italiana 5% in 1853, for example, the members
of the Genoa Stock Exchange were making deals based on Paris prices that were three days old. Prices were two days
old from 1860, one day old from March 1864 (Da Pozzo, 1964, p.11). Rendita Paris price was received daily in Turin
from 1871, and from the Turin Stock Exchange was delivered the same day to Alessandria, Milan, Venice and Genoa
Stock Exchanges.
A temporal delay, of any length, caused considerable problems in settling bargains, which the Italian buyer or
seller expected to complete by selling or buying abroad, if prices had changed substantially from those current in Paris
at the time the sale or purchase was agreed.
It was possible to minimize the risk by purchasing a put or a call option in Paris. Through such options the
purchaser obtained the right to buy or sell a security for a fixed price at a certain date in the future. This allowed the
Paris price to be fixed and provided sufficient time to allow conditions in other markets to be investigated, with the
hope of a profit resulting for any differentials that were found to exist. Naturally, those guaranteeing to buy or sell at
current prices in several months time charged for the privilege they were extending, and such a charge could be quite
high. For a similar account, relating to the London stock exchange, see Michie (1987, pp. 39-41).
25The concomitant introduction of limitations to coupon collection abroad by Italians (affidavit)  might  have
raised the elements of uncertainty relating to the freedom of capital movements, but this would only marginally have14
There was no reason whatsoever for the spot  arbitrage not to operate with a depreciating
currency, as Romanelli clearly related in his statement to the Prime Minister in March 1875.
26 The
opening up of the ratio between the Rendita price in Milan relative to Paris, if there were such a
thing, was very limited indeed, and lay within the brokerage fees independently of the exchange
regime (Figure 3).
27
3. Throwing Sand under the Wheels of International Finance. Rendita Market Segmentation.
The stakes for the Italian government to increase seigniorage through inflation and depreciation
on its huge public debt were high, but the government was strongly constrained by its dependence
on the international capital market. The total Rendita outstanding was made up of bearer Rendita
and registered Rendita. Interest was paid in lire on registered Rendita and bearer Rendita on the
domestic market. It was paid in gold on Rendita collected abroad.
The lira exchange at parity, Milan Rendita and Paris Rendita bore the same rate of interest;
interest was collected at no cost  either in Milan or in Paris. Each time the lira devalued, Italian
registered Rendita holders and less sophisticated Italian bearer Rendita holders collected interest
domestically, in lire,  and had a lower return.
28 Smart Italian Rendita holders went to Paris and were
paid a higher interest. Should lira appreciate over parity and shift foreign investors’ preferences
towards interest in lire, any  Frenchman (or any Italian keeping his bonds abroad) could take the
                                                                                                                                                        
affected spot arbitrage. Weekly data point to a limited enlargement of the  arbitrage  margin, during the 1893 Italian
banking crisis, but not to a systematic deviation.
26 Alessandro Romanelli was the secretary of ‘Consiglio del commercio e dell’ industria’ (Trade  and Industry
Board) and was asked for a statement to the Prime Minister by the Minister of Finance and by the Minister of
Agriculture, Industry and Trade (De Cecco, 1990, doc. 123, p. 628).
27 Interestingly enough, Pantaleoni had made an entirely different  point. He had argued  that in the case of
depreciation, although Rendita owners abroad felt safe because of the interest in gold, the existence of the gold clause
itself would have burdened the budget and raised fears of Italian government default among foreign investors.
(Pantaleoni, 1895, p. 377).
28 Insurance companies, trade companies, banks doing business with the government were subject to government
regulation and kept part of their investments in registered Rendita, as a guarantee (Nina, 1911-1915, p. 1210). They
were unwilling to endanger their relationship with the government in order to profit from a small discount on the Lira.
In effect the government was imposing a tax on Italian institutional investors.15
coupon to the authorized bank in Paris and collect it in lire with no charge.  Coupon flow was
asymmetric. When the lira depreciated, Italians went to Paris; Frenchmen never went to Italy.
Each time the lira depreciated, the government collected seigniorage on debt by exploiting
domestic Rendita investors. The divergence between the Paris interest in lire net of transfer costs
and the Milan interest is a measure of the cost of the institutional rigidities that separated the two
classes of Italian investors.
Commission on coupons paid in Paris was modest. It varied widely between 0.5% to just
three weeks’ loss of interest, i.e. 0.15-0.18% (Dubois, 1890, pp. 287-294).
Arbitrage on coupon collection in the domestic and in the foreign market must take directly
into account the cost of collecting abroad, a’. To make arbitrage profitable, domestic interest must
be inferior to the interest collected in Paris (Milan via Paris) net of all cost:
iMt
°  £  iMt(1 - a’) (8)
This sets a lower bound, L’Bt  , to the bi-annual  interest  difference  between the domestic
secluded market and the domestic competitive market:
- iMta’/2 = L’Bt (9)
Italian investors facing depreciation were induced to look for safer investments abroad, but
Rendita coupon transfer guaranteed the real value of their domestic investment at a very limited
cost. Coupon transfer implied a repeated burden through time, but it was a much easier operation
than capital transfer; it did not require any knowledge of the international market and was free of
any risk as it was completed in a couple of days. When the lira depreciated, the Treasury was faced
with a high  amount of payments in gold to service its debt: coupons were collected in large
quantities by Italians in Paris, which inflamed the debate in the Italian Parliament (De Cecco, 1990,
doc. 45, p. 123; Ministero del Tesoro, 1896, pp. 104-105).
Rendita cashed abroad varied between 20 and 85% of the total bearer Rendita value. People
moved  quickly between the two markets: a limited  devaluation of 3%, in 1882 - 1883, no
impediment pending, was sufficient to double the amount collected abroad (Figure 4 and Ministero
del Tesoro, 1896, p. 120). Depreciation induced people to move from registered Rendita to bearer
Rendita, which was much more difficult to subject to fiscal controls, and this was something that the
Italian Treasury wished to avoid at all costs.16
Let AB be the Rendita in circulation. CB is the registered part plus the quota of the bearer
Rendita, whose interest is collected  domestically  because of institutional  rigidities, AC is the
Rendita whose interest can be collected either in Milan or in Paris. The actual shift is a function of
the lira devaluation (AE), and on the cost of collecting interest abroad (ZF), which increases with the
quantity  arbitraged, but for a fixed  quota AZ. Y* is a possible equilibrium  solution. A high
depreciation would shift Y* to the right, Y’ , inducing less sophisticated Italian investors to rush to
collect their coupons abroad, eventually reducing their  registered  Rendita  holdings  (from CB to
Y’B). Such a move would have reduced the possible seignorage to the Italian government.
 A legal segmentation of the Rendita market was a way out of the puzzle. All Italians would
be paid in devalued  lire  and foreigners would be paid in gold; Italian domestic  investors were
exploited while the Italian government’s reputation over the international market was maintained.17
Rendita interest collected abroad in gold by Italians was denied in January 1873; the denial
was reinforced with the introduction of the affidavit in 1874 (first semester coupon).
29 Affidavit
was subsequently made less stringent in 1879, abolished in 1881, re-introduced in 1893 (second
semester coupon) and abolished again 11 years later, i.e. towards the end of 1904. Affidavit was a
sworn declaration  (or a solemn promise, if addressed to a non-religious person) that the principal in
question did not belong to an Italian citizen, and it was required when collecting interest abroad. The
coupon presented to the bank was to be accompanied by the principal (at various times) and this
made interest collection abroad expensive and risky.
30 In addition to this, monetary incentives for
Rendita owners to cash their coupon in Milan were variously provided.
31
The use of the affidavit allowed the Italian government to raise seigniorage on the whole Italian
public debt, except for the part owned by investors of foreign nationality, which was a small part,
according to Minister Antonio Scialoja  in his financial statement to the King (De Cecco, 1990, p.
25, footnote 30).
When affidavit came into force, the Rendita market was divided up according to nationality
(and no longer according to the place where the coupon was collected), and Italians were forced to be
                                                
29 There were rumors that the first affidavit was weakly enforced and that the second was much more rigorous. A
French commentator, Georges Deloison wrote that “Italy required the affidavit, but never requested for registry dues and
did not require that the bearer came in person to sign the affidavit” (1890, p. 291).
30 The government wanted to prevent the transfer of the coupon by passing it from hand to hand just to collect
the interest abroad. The transfer of the principal made the operation much more expensive, as it related to a value that
was ten to fifteen times larger than the value to be collected.
31  Interest was paid on the domestic market in advance of maturity (up to 60 days) and the interest claim could
also be used to pay taxes (custom duties and other fiscal charges) before the coupon came to maturity (up to 5 months).
(Piccinelli, 1897, pp. 17-19).18
paid in lire both at home and abroad. In addition, the Italian government provided incentives to
induce nationals to cash on the domestic market, basically paying interest in advance with respect to
maturity. The latter amounted to a (very limited) increase of the domestic interest, and it was an
open  admission that  legal  impediments were not of much use when lira  devaluation overflowed
certain limits.
Rendita market Rendita price Nominal rate of interest Rendita yield
Competitive:Paris 74.77 francs 5 francs 6.69%
Secluded:Milan 80.00 lire 5 lire 6.25%
The affidavit was far from an absolute impediment. It was legally dodged by the more astute
Italian investors, who transferred the property of their bonds to French nationals just before the
coupon came to maturity, and purchased it again at the next settlement date. Italians, the possibility
of perjury excluded,  transferred their Rendita selling spot  and buying long (Stringher, 1884), i.e.
through a repurchase agreement (repo). Contracts were long available in Paris for Rendita bulks
exceeding 2500 francs, and were settled on the first and the fifteenth of each month (Lefevre, 1870,
pp. 215-217). A time component, as well as a risk component, was now included in what had been a
spot arbitrage.
Because of the fear of further discrimination towards nationals who had their capitals abroad,
repo costs and monetary incentives reduced the margin for cashing abroad to a tiny amount even for
large investors.
32 In the second semester of 1893, lira depreciation reached 13%, repos were cheap
(0.05-0.07 cents), Rendita implicit interest was around 3% (semi-annual). Costs for arbitraging the
Rendita through a repo operation varied widely with the value exchanged, nonetheless they  can be
tentatively summarised as:
                                                
32 I am grateful to Marc Flandreau and Pierre Sicsic who forwarded me their series of Rendita repo prices in
Paris.19
Italian making a repo in Paris1893,29
th December
Rendita price in Paris   79.850
Coupon/Paris price 3.131
Repurchase agreement brokerage fees (0.1%,Lefèvre, 1870, 218) 0.080
Repurchase agreement cost     0.060
Interest on money advance between settlement dates (15 days) at 6% 0.008
Coupon collection charges (0.25%)   0.001
Implicit interest on repurchase agreement 2.982
Italian cashing on the domestic market 1893,29
th December
Rendita price in Milan  90.700
Coupon/Milan price 2.756
Opportunity cost: advance payments in Italy (60 days) at 6% 0.010
Implicit interest on the domestic market 2.766
The return accruing to Italians cashing abroad from lira depreciation (13.6%; the bi-annual
interest collected in Paris was 3.130 instead of 2.756) was thus reduced to 7.8%, from which
telegraph and transfer costs were further to be deducted. At the end of 1893, people shifted to the
domestic market, and the margin that remained nonetheless might be assumed as a measure of the
increase in risk perceived by Italian investors when keeping their capital abroad, following the strict
enforcement of the affidavit. In the early 1880s, before affidavit, a much less reduced margin was
required to induce Italians to cash abroad.
The working of the affidavit with a repo contract can be easily  formalized. To induce an
Italian investor to collect in Paris through a repo, domestic interest must be inferior to Paris interest
net of all cost.
iMt
°(1+it)
n £ iMt(1+ it)
m[1- a∞  - b(q)] (10)
This sets a lower bound to the bi-annual interest difference, LBt ∞
- iMt[a∞  + b(q)]/2 ª  LBt ∞ (11)
a∞  are repo  fees, b repo cost, function of the quantity traded, q, it the interest on money
advances between settlements dates, which is assumed equal to the interest on advance payments in
Italy. Brokerage fees and repo cost are much larger than collection charges, and the lower boundary
to the interest difference is larger, in absolute terms, than before: LBt ∞  < L’Bt. In addition affidavit
acted as an announcement that the return of the whole operation was becoming more uncertain.20
Five-percent Rendita coupons paid abroad went  from 85% of the total value of the bearer
Rendita in the second semester of 1893 to as little as 35% six months later, when the affidavit was
enforced (Figure 4 and Ministero  del Tesoro, 1906, p. 120).
33  Various factors strengthened the
effect of the affidavit. French owners sold much of their Rendita possessions: Italy’s country risk,
measured by the difference between the French Rente and the Rendita yield in France (both in the
same currency) increased radically from July 1893 as the Italian budget worsened again, and this
induced French investors to turn to other government bonds. In spring 1893 a new tax was imposed
on the French stock exchange,
34 and there was a rumour of a similar measure on foreign securities
(Felloni, 1964, p. 206).
Subsequently, the recovery of Rendita prices under pressure from operators in the German
market, paralleled by exchange appreciation, made it less profitable for Italians to cash their coupons
abroad.
35 The saving on the debt service for the Treasury attributable to the decline of the coupons
paid abroad (affidavit and other concurrent circumstances) was around 6% of the Rendita net
interest payment on 1
st January 1894.
36
Affidavit  did not work as an absolute dam. It raised the threshold to make interest collection
abroad  profitable: a much larger  depreciation was now required to perform the  same transfer
operation that 10 years earlier had been profitable with a lira exchange  falling 2% or 3% short of
parity. Had the lira devalued more than, say, 15%, people would have flocked abroad again and the
Treasury would have spent a larger sum in servicing its debt.
                                                
33 The decline of the value of coupons cashed abroad is matched by a corresponding increase in the amount of
the coupons for which advance collection was claimed domestically (Ministero del Tesoro, 1896, pp.122-123, 127-128;
1906, p. 120).
34  Art.28 of the law 28.4.1893. It created a real stir in the Italian press, see, for example, L’economista,
22.1.1893. pp. 53-55;18.6.1893, pp. 386-387; 12.11.1893, p. 735.
35 In the mid-1890s, according to the Italian financial newspaper  Il Sole, repo prices became  “outrageously”
expensive, reaching 30 cents (Il Sole, 5.01.1895 and 30.06.1895), and as the lira exchange  depreciation  declined in
time, it was more profitable to cash domestically.
36  Measured by the  exchange  depreciation  times the variation in the bearer  Rendita interest payments
domestically collected, plus the commission to be paid to the French intermediary.21
The fluctuation of the number of coupons paid abroad had nothing to do with capital flows in
and out of Italy, as is frequently alleged.
37 With transfer costs short of return, people sent their
coupons abroad, just to cash a larger amount, independently of where their capital stayed. It was
simply the additional costs placed on collecting interest abroad and the recovery of the lira exchange
that explained the decline in the Rendita interest paid in the foreign market in gold.
<Figure 4 approximately here>
4. A Test of Capital Markets Integration.
The Italian government  was variously constrained by the need  not to discourage  private
capital that was abundantly entering the country and by the need to keep the door open to possible
placements of new government  issues.  Rendita market integration between Italy  and its most
important partner, France, is tested in terms of  equilibrium prices: Rendita prices in Paris and
Milan, the lira/franc exchange, transfer costs and incentives when needed. Rendita arbitrage condition
in (1) is estimated. There is no reason for (1) to occur whenever there is a break in Rendita
transferability between the domestic and the foreign market.
The model to be estimated in its simplest form, is:
PMt/PPt
* =  a0e t + ut  (12)
a0 is a parameter, ut   is a white noise disturbance.  
PMt  and  PPt
* are I(1) variables, the exchange deviation, e t,  is a  stationary variable I(0).
ao= 1 can be imposed: H0: a0= 1 , H1: a0 π  1.
 A cointegration estimation has been performed using both the Engle and Granger and the
Johansen procedures. Results appear self-reinforcing and we report the cointegrating vector obtained
with the Johansen estimation method:
PMt/PPt
*   1.00000
                                                
37 For most of the period, interest collection abroad required the presentation of the accompanying principal; as a
consequence  capitals would move following the coupon transfers. But this was a kind of “anomaly”,  capitals
“shadowed” the coupon for just the time necessary to collect it abroad. Possibly  capitals were  left  abroad to save
recurrent transfer costs. Zamagni (1999, p. 339) writes that the amount of coupons paid abroad “is useful as it provides
an idea of  the amount of the Italian debt placed abroad”. This might be true in a period of exchange convertibility, but
not in other periods.22
et  - 1.00132
st.error                  (.005)
The result points to the acceptance of the null hypothesis, a0 = 1. It is very robust to a wide
range of lags specification in the underlying VAR models. Residuals have been tested  and are
stationary.
Had capital been effectively discouraged from flowing abroad and had the affidavit  prevented
people from collecting Rendita coupons abroad, there would be no reason for the arbitrage relation
to hold. Various dummies have been added to (10) in order to test the effect of the lira depreciation
and of  the affidavit on the arbitrage relation, with no result. The restricted estimates were never
significant.
A further point would be to assess for a possible correlation  between  lira  exchange
fluctuations  and  the  loosening of financial market integration between France and Italy. The
hypothesis is that market efficiency is somehow connected to the exchange  regime, or at least to
exchange stability. Fluctuations in the exchange do not make a significant difference and the  zero
Rendita arbitrage assumption worked rather smoothly both in periods of exchange tranquillity and in
periods during which the lira exchange  underwent relative rapid fluctuations. Figure 5 shows the
absence of correlation between an exchange variability measure (the six-month standard deviation of
the weekly lira exchange deviations from parity) and a measure of the exchange fluctuations (the six-
month standard deviation of the weekly Rendita arbitrage deviations).
38
Italy was very effectively integrated in the international financial market, even though it had a
fluctuating exchange for such a long period of time.
39
<Figure 5 approximately here>
                                                
38 The same basic idea underlies one of the recent IMF reports where exchange flexibility diffusion is parallel
with the process of capital market globalization. (IMF, 1997).
39 Both the affidavit and exchange fluctuations can be viewed as a sign of the weakness of the Italian situation,
which is accompanied by an increase risk in collecting the coupon abroad and in investing abroad. Coupons abroad
declined both after 1874 and 1893, and investments abroad declined too, but this is quite a different matter from the
arbitrage relation!23
5. Conclusions.
The choice of the lira exchange regime was not primarily dictated by the government’s aim to
wipe out the value of the Italian huge public debt overhang. It was the need to keep the banks of
issue – which were also commercial  banks – solvent and to foster the economy that made
suspension a necessity, both in 1866-1873 and for a few years after the 1883 resumption. In 1866
the creditors themselves favored suspension in the attempt to limit the  fall of  Rendita  prices.
Currency holders suffered a decline in the market value of their assets whenever the lira depreciated;
similar discrimination affected domestic Rendita holders. The government collected seigniorage both
on short-term advances from the Banca Nazionale and on its public debt, which was serviced on the
domestic market. Other countries resorted to the same procedure, as Calomiris (1991) has studied
for the United States and Bordo and Redish (1990) for Canada.
Seigniorage on debt was limited as the Italian debt was basically a gold debt. A large part of
the Italian public debt was represented by Rendita, a consol placed both in the domestic and in the
international market. Rendita gold coupons  were created in order to protect Italian and foreign
investors against  possible  lira  depreciation  during  risky periods. The alliance  between  Italian
politicians and financiers was very strong, and Italian financiers operated directly on the French
capital market.
There was a unique market for bearer and mixed Rendita holders, even though transactions
were made either in Rome, Milan, Genoa, Paris, Berlin, London or Vienna. Registered Rendita and
small Rendita holders were limited to the domestic market. Each time the lira depreciated, coupons
cashed domestically had a lower interest rate: smart holders cashed abroad and registered holders and
less sophisticated investors suffered a loss. The government  attempted to exploit the Rendita
market segmentation by allowing the lira to depreciate, while insisting that domestic holders accept
lira. But the international capital market was a sophisticated market,  and  Paris  offered Italian
investors a large selection of foreign bonds and various forms of deferred agreements on the Rendita,
frequently settled, that variously constrained the action of the government and prevented the Italian
government from taking full advantage of the lira depreciation.
Had the exchange lost more than 10-12% of its value, notwithstanding the affidavit, Rendita
holders would have flocked abroad, Italian public debt would have become a gold debt, and the24
Treasury  would have suffered a substantial loss of gold.
40 Hence the convenience to the  Italian
goverment to let the lira  float downward and exploit seignorage  any  time domestic conditions
became more critical, and at the same time the need to keep depreciation within a limited range,
“shadowing” the lira par value.
                                                
40 Toniolo, in assessing the effects of the forced currency circulation, speculates that suspension resulted in an
“increase in domestic prices (that) produced a reduction in the real value of the outstanding debt”  (1990,63). In fact, the
ability of the Italian government to profit from seigniorage was rather limited.25
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Appendix 1.
Weekly Rendita Italiana prices and weekly lira exchange rates.
Rendita        italiana       5       %        in        Italy   . Friday published prices refer to Thursday  stock  exchange  prices,  registered  each
Friday in Il Sole from 1865 to 1911.
Price is “ fine corrente”, except “fine mese prossimo”, which is the last Friday of each month. This was the price
at which the bulk of Rendita transactions took place both in Italy and in France, where foreign government bonds were
mainly exchanged  ‘à la Coulisse’. See L’economista, 22.1.1893, 55.
Generally  prices are registered in Milan, sporadically Turin, in subordinate places Genoa, Florence. Prices are
extreme daily values: maximum and minimum. Daily ranges are replaced by their midpoint of the buying and selling
rates. Missing values are substituted by the next day’s prices. After 8 May 1908 interest was converted to 3.75%.
Rendita         Italiana        5%         in          France   . Thursday prices registered each Friday. Almost always in Paris, except for a few
cases in Lyons or Marseilles. Il Sole from 1865 to 1911. L’économiste français and Cours Authentiques.
Exchange         Lira         French         Franc        in          Milan  .  Thursday prices registered each  Friday. Milan. Published in Spinelli
F.(1990, vol. 2). Lire per a fixed unit of foreign currency. Among various prices we have chosen “lettera” o “a breve”
meaning at sight. From 1865 to 5.6.1868, 30 days after sight. From 12.6.1868 to 30.4.1869, 90 days after sight.
A consistent series requires that all observations pertain to bills of a given maturity t. Logically, t = 0, the
series should refer consistently to sight billls. Because the lira purchaser of a time bill obtains his franc-fund later than
the purchaser of an equivalent sight bill, the interest component of the time bill reduces the exchange rate . To factor
out the interest component of a t-day time bill, an annual interest rate is needed. The appropriate  rate of interest is
registered alongside the exchange price.
When the lira  was convertible the lira price 30 days after sight was discounted at the official rate of discount to
get the sight price. This was done until convertibility was abolished in 1866.
The discount procedure  was no longer feasible with  unconvertible  exchange. In this  case  the  exchange at
maturity contains a forward premium or discount, i.e. an expectation element on the  future sight price, which is not
easily computable. For this reason the lira exchange from  1866 to 30.4.1869 has not been transformed into sight.29
Appendix 2
Integration test





 Dickey-F -3.61704 -3.71681
 Phillips    -25.57075 -76.99540
P-values
 Wtd.Sym. 0.07892 0.08325
 Dickey-F 0.02843 0.02127
 Phillips 0.02247 0.00000
Number of lags
 Wtd.Sym.  10 9
 Dickey-F  10 9
 Phillips 10 14
p-values from McKinnon Tables.
Johansen estimate for cointegrating vectors.












Rendita Milan/Paris price       1.000000              1.00000
Exchange                                -1.000132              1.44325
(st. error)                                   (0.005)30
Integration test:



































































































































































































































































































































































































































Rendita Price in Milan
Rendita Price in Paris32
























































































































































































































































































































































































































six monts standard dev. of the weekly exchange deviations from parity.
six monts standard dev. of the weekly deviations from the Rendita spot